Members of parliamentary institutions have a special feature of their discourse community open to them in argumentationÐ the use of the public record as an authority for others' exact words. We show how members of the British House of Commons use the ocial record explicitly to recruit their political opponents' words to promote their own projects. We identify a robust set of elements in which a speaker quotes someone understood to be a political opponent, invoking the unimpeachable source of the parliamentary record. Speakers can exploit the basic framework of the device to emphasize (with dramatic or comic eect) the identity of the quoted source. The rhetorical eect in all cases is that such words are especially unchallengeable, and the fact that they are sourced from an opponent's own mouth makes the message they carry immune to attack as interested or partial.
Introduction
Can you use other people to back up what you yourself are saying? Can you, indeed, use the exact words of your declared opponents to do so? In this article we focus on how, in one specially favored discursive domain, a parliamentary chamber, speakers use opponents' words to promote their own arguments. We use data from the British House of Commons, but we are not speci®cally concerned with British politics or British discourse as suchÐour interest is in how speakers make use of a crucial feature of any parliamentary scene, that is, members' open access to a public record of their political opponents' words.
The verbatim record allows members to make a point of invoking others' words literally. Literal quotation, of course, is available to any ordinary speaker, but in everyday talk there is normally no record of what has been said, and literality is a ®gure of speech. Speakers can and do use prosody, quotation, and pragmatic implication to mark what they are saying as direct reported speech, (Holt 1996 (Holt , 2000 Klewitiz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999) , but can never ground it in a public record in quite the same way that parliamentarians can. By seeing how this potential is used in parliament we hope to add to the literature on parliamentary argumentation and to make a bridge to the discursive study of language in use, especially as it touches on people's concern with accountability and authority (Leudar 1995 (Leudar , 1998 Edwards and Potter 1992; Antaki 1994; Billig 1987 Billig /1996 , and speci®cally on their use of other people as authority for their arguments (Dickerson 1997) .
Literal quotation in a parliamentary setting, as elsewhere, is to be compared to other ways of formulating people's positionsÐusing direct or indirect reported speech, or by freely attributing others with various wants, beliefs, dispositions, and so on (see Antaki 1994) . We shall be arguing that the use of verbatim reports of others' speech, authorized by the record, is very dierent to these other alternatives which are open to a speaker, especially to colorful and patently interested redescription (whose analysis in a variety of contexts is the subject of much ethnomethodologically inspired work, especially the discursive psychology of Edwards and Potter 1992) . We focus on parliamentarians' literal quotation, but not their literal quotation of just anythingÐthey quote a variety of sources, including ocial reports, letters from constituents, poetry, news headlines, extra-parliamentary speeches, and so on. Rather, we look at their quoting of their opponents in the House. We want to focus on the rhetorical device of recruiting an opponent's recorded words to support the speaker's own position.
Interestingly enough, the literature on persuasion and rhetoric, so far as we can tell, seems to have overlooked authorized literal quotation as a resource. Dickerson (1997) , for example, who has an extensive list of ways in which others' views are deployed in one's own argument, does not mention parliamentary exchanges. (He has, though, one particularly signi®cant example of political talk, which we examine as example [15] in this article.) The use of this rhetorical device in the British House of Commons is not rareÐstatistical counting is not the focus of this paper, but it helps to know that what we are talking about happens about once in a week's worth of debate, and is treated, as we shall see, as a fairly routine activity.
In examining how speakers use others' words in that way, we shall perforce have to entertain a certain amount of complexity in the interplay between the words recruited and the respective parties' actual or claimed argumentative positions. This all militates against a mere quantitative counting of the occasions on which others' words are used for a speaker's own purposes. Even if that could be done, it would shed no light on how speakers do so, to what ends, and with what implications for their own and the others' positions. So we are shepherded towards a close qualitative analysis of a set of exemplary cases where reference to various parties' positions is reasonably intelligible. In what follows we shall ®rst give a feel for what literal quotation looks like, and compare it to nonliteral quotation. Then, in the body of the article, we shall catalogue a set of examples of the device at work. Finally, to show that the members of the parliamentary community orient to its various elements, we shall cite illustrative marginal cases and end with one telling example where the speaker is thwarted in his attempt to bring o the maneuvre. It is important to reiterate at this point that we do not want to claim to be making any political analysis in this article; nor does it matter to our argument that the speakers are members of the British House of Commons as opposed to any other parliamentary body. We aim to perform a discursive analysis of a technique of rhetoric open to any member of an institution that publishes authoritative records of its verbal proceedings.
Analysis
Our analysis is based on the talk as transcribed by clerks into the`ocial record' of the British parliament (commonly referred to as Hansard). Such records are a routine part of parliamentary life. In the Australian, Canadian, and Indian parliaments, the verbatim record, following British usage, is also called Hansard; in Sweden, the equivalent is the Riksdag Protokoll; in the United States, the Congressional Record; and so on. Our choice of speeches to sample was triggered by happening to spot something interesting in some materials we were looking at for quite other reasons (a debate on Northern Ireland), and, holding that instance in mind, we carried on looking until we had gathered a sucient set of further examples (that is to say, until we had what we hold to be a persuasive sample of speakers citing the record, and variants on this canonical core). The period covered is from April 1996 to December 1997.
The style of our analysis owes a great deal to the ethnomethodological sentiment of looking to see how people display their understanding of the world in the way they organize their visible activities. The general sentiment has been re®ned in various ways over the years since Gar®nkel's classic collection of early ethnomethodological studies (1967) , and what we have found most helpful in this investigation of parliamentary speech is the strand developed by discursive psychologists. The idea here is to attend very closely to the actual design of people's talk, using conversational analytic insights into the way talk moves the interaction on, and keeping a weather eye open for such robust devices as quotation, use of descriptions, and displays of accountability. That approach has a fair track record in analyzing political talk, illuminating such things as`facts' in disputes over lobby brie®ngs (Edwards and Potter 1990) , the death of Princess Diana (MacMillan and Edwards 1999), or the portrayal of Romanies in political argument (Leudar and Nekvapil 2000) , but is perhaps better known for its application to topics traditionally considered to lie within the domain of social psychology (e.g., arguing and thinking, in Billig [1996] or Antaki [1994] ; prejudice and stereotyping, in Wetherell and Potter [1992] ; identity, in Antaki and Widdicombe [1998] ; or madness, in Leudar and Thomas [2000: chap. 8] ). Its essential features, whether analyzing material from the political or the mundane world, are a close attention to the details of talk, and a commitment to analyzing what interests talk serves.
Our data in this article are parliamentary records of speeches. In common with other parliamentary records known to us, Hansard is, of course, not transcribed in the same way as would be done in conversation analysis (see, for example, the discussion of transcription in ten Have 1999). But there are two good reasons to proceed with Hansard as it stands. The sort of rhetorical devices we are looking for work at a discursive level. This is to say, we expect them to work via their lexical realization and their sequential placement in argumentation, both of which are captured in Hansard, even though other aspects of the talk, such as prosody, are not. Moreover, it is Hansard which the members of the House of Commons use as the authoritative verbal record of their debates, rather than some private transcription, even if it were more complete. In this sense what ethnomethodologists call members are literally Members (of Parliament), and they orient to Members' resources. Hansard is a resource for arguments in the House, and especially those in which what was said is reported directly. Take for instance the following text (we have added the italics and line numbers to this and all other examples).
(1) [Hansard vol. 293, 2 April 1996, cols. 294 ±295] 1 Rev. Ian Paisley: We see in the proposals before us another 2 attack on the Forum. I was reading in Hansard of 24 January 3 1996 that the Prime Minister, replying to the Leader of 4 Her Majesty's Opposition, had some interesting things to say 5 A about the Forum. I was not in the House the day he made 6 A that statement, but he said:`I see the election providing a 7 pool of representatives from which party delegations to the 8 talks could be drawn, and a means to index the strength of 9 the parties delegations in the talks process.'
Note that the speaker, as he himself makes clear, was not in the House when the words he quotes were uttered by the Prime Minister. His report is based exclusively on the record in Hansard, and not at all on his personal experience. It is worth noting here how it is that the Hansard sta recognize that a Member actually is quoting. In the foregoing case, it is explicit in lines 2 and 3. In other cases, the quotation is not so explicitly marked. According to the editor of Hansard, in those cases`we rely on the reporter to recognize when a quotation is being made. It is often easy to spot. There may be a change of tone, the Member can be seen to be carefully reading his notes, when before he was simply referring to them' (Church, personal communication). They will, however, check the quote's accuracy:
We will not print a quotation as a quotation unless we are able to check it ourselves. We do not take a Member's word that the quotation he includes in his notes is accurate. If we cannot check it we put the words in third person. (Church, personal communication) The issue of whether the quotation really is accurate and from Hansard is a live matter for the Members too. Personal memory, or simple assertion, can be challenged. When it is, it is Hansard that is the authority, as the following example shows:
(2) [Hansard vol. XXX, 26 November 1997, cols given the forces of the free market?
The speaker (Duncan) is attempting to show the inconsistency between his opponent's words in the past and his present behavior. It is noteworthy that the target of the talk, Battle, explicitly calls for his tormentor to back up his claimsÐ`Quote me', he challenges. This reveals the underlying expectation that the reference to others, if to be brought o, needs Hansard's authority. Indeed, even Duncan orients to this, in his explicit invocation of Hansard in his attempt to de¯ect Battle's challenge (line 12). (This is a good point at which to remind the reader that we are not interested in what political sides these two speakers represent, nor even that they are British; we are interested only in the formal features of their talk and, of course, speci®cally their use of the authorized verbatim record.)
Using others' words nonliterally
Before we get on to see how the recruitment of others' words literally can be turned to advantage, it is worth pausing for a moment just to compare what the rhetorical eect can be of using your opponent's words without making a play for their literalness or invoking the public record. We will see that the eect is much more straightforwardly deprecatory, as in the examples which follow.
(3) [Hansard vol. 293, 23 April 1996, col of the law, where the parties to a contract are said to require 4 a consensus ad idem, so that they are thinking about the 5 same thing when they arrive at the subject matter of their 6 A contract. However, the way in which the hon. Member for 7 A South Down uses the word`consensus' suggests that nothing 8 A can be agreed unless the tiniest minority accepts it. That is a 9 dog-in-the-manger's charter.
We notice in examples (3) and (4) that while alluding to others' talk, the speaker is using the opportunity of paraphrase to redescribe what they say in terms which are loaded with evaluation. In example (3), far from using words which could be heard as literal reported speech or even as neutral indirect reported speech, Ross claims that his opponent`proposed apple pie and motherhood'. He then assesses the eects of his words with the following description:`we moved through pious hope back into the age of miracles', and his sarcasm expresses vividly the worthlessness of whatever his opponent said. The paraphrase provides grounds for the subsequent rejection. In example (4), McCartney comments on his opponent's use of a speci®c word, which he actually reports, consensus. This use diers from his own and he formulates it in such a way so as to warrant his claim that what is being proposed is a`dog-in-the-manger's charter'. Such absurdity put into the mouth of an opponent is (to say the least) not intended to be heard as a literal description of what he said, and its rhetorical eect is, of course, deprecatory. Those whose words have been so treated in a paraphrase can attend to the attributed absurdity and resist it. Another MP, Soley, does just that in the following case.
(5) [Hansard vol. 293, 23 April 1996, col (Pomerantz 1986 ). As Edwards (2000) says about this sort of extreme description (every time, top speed, one in a million, and so on), they are in one sense a curiously vulnerable ®gure of speech to use: any extreme case can be punctured and rebutted easily and simply. If the Mounties claim`we always get our man', then a single escapee is enough to discredit them. Indeed in the last case we see how easily Soley rebuts Paisley's claim. All he has to do is make the all-too-plausible point that (of course) he never said such a thingÐ`I do not claim that it was wonderful. I actually said that _ ' Ðand he then has an opportunity to restate his position. But, as Edwards (2000) observes, the point of extreme case formulations is not their literal vulnerability to such simple rebuttal; the speaker means to get across what is importantly the case, and may dismiss`factual' rebuttal as irrelevant and pedantic. Vivid and absurd description makes clear what it is that the speaker wants people to see as being the crucial point of what the other saidÐas Edwards has it, such extreme formulations are understandable`not as failed eorts at accurate description but as it seemed as if, or it is essentially so kinds of proposals' (Edwards 2000: 359 ; emphasis in original). So we hear Ross's`apple pie and motherhood' in example (3) and McCartney's`nothing can be agreed unless the tiniest majority accepts it' and`bringing us _ to paradise' in example (4) as their attempts to convey not what someone literally said but what they essentially meant. This is a very dierent way of speaking than making your case literally.
Literal recruitment
Florid redescription in parliamentary debate of the sort in examples (3) and (4) forms the background against which sober, non-extreme quotation is to be heard. The device of recruiting one's opponent's words literally, by establishing a ground base of authorized quotation, is really a matter of using the words as they were recorded. How this is done, and with what rhetorical eects, is what we now turn to. We organize the exposition according to two crucial elements (the establishment of the quoted speaker as a known antagonist; the assertion of the informativeness of what they are recorded to have said) and one optional one, the dramatization of the quoted speaker's identity.
Recruiting a speaker who is obviously from the other side Let us start with the issue of who the quoted source is. The speaker in the following example is concerned to establish the authority and literalness of his quotation, which is of course the de®ning feature of literal quotation, and then goes on to explicate the relevance of the quoted source's identity.
(6) [Hansard vol. 302, 3 December 1997, col. 422] 1 Mr. Rammell: Some clarity and some facts are welcome in 2 the debate. The rhetoric used by the Conservatives is 3 important. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and 4 A Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) said to the former Prime Minister, the 5 A right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), a couple 6 A of years ago:`I hope that my right hon. Friend can in¯uence 7 A the Government, so that we British can be proud of the things 8 A that are our heritage. That is completely dierent from 9 A spending our time attacking our allies and neighbours for 10 A what, allegedly, they are doing, because that is xenophobic. 'Ð 11 A [Ocial Report, 7 February 1996, vol. 271, col. 410 In understanding what is going on in this extract, a bit of background will be helpful. Rammell is a Minister in the Labour Government; the speaker he is quoting (Sir Edward Heath) is known to all not only as a Conservative, but as an ex-Prime Minister. Heath is quoted as directing his speech at the then current Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, and what he is speaking aboutÐin case there was any ambiguityÐis not _ the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats: he was talking about the Conservative party and Conservative Members'. To quote Heath's literal words in this way is far more powerful than merely to have referred to his pro-Europeanism (which would have been well known to the House), without speci®c citation. Rammell has recruited Heath to the service of showing how even the most heavyweight opponent (an ex-Prime Minister, the sort of person who suciently outranks a serving Prime Minister to oer him advice) agrees with Labour policies.
Here is another example of the recruitment of a heavyweight opponent, this time one who at the time occupied the Ministerial position now occupied by the current speaker, and hence bore the same responsibilities; the issue is the banning of beef on the bone due to health concerns: (7) Nothing in what I have decided is going to harm anyone. 7 A [ _ ] In June 1994, the right hon. Member for South-West 8 A Norfolk (Mrs. Shephard) said that she had to act with 9 A`extreme caution in relation to BSE _ to ensure that the 10 A tissues in which infectivity might potentially occur are 11 A removed from the human _ food chain.'Ð [Ocial Report, 12 30 June 1994, vol. 245, col. 654.] That was the position of 13 the Government supported by the right hon. Member for 14
East Devon (Sir P. Emery). Our position is the same.
Cunningham's quotation of Shephard in the arrowed lines in example (7) is given extra power by the fact that the latter is not only from the opposing Party, but (something which is not obvious from the extract, but would have been well known to all members of the House) that she was his exact counterpart when her Party was in power. The policies she adhered to then are thus still more apt and relevant to his situationÐ since they had to be feasible and realistic. Not only an opponent, then, but a specially relevant one is recruited here. Government's strategy for punishing the guilty.
Straw treats the Conservative aliation of his quoted source Waddington as suciently obvious to allow him to burlesque it in an absurd inversion: that he is`that well-known left-winger'. The phrasing of this formulation as an ironic aside resists any hearing as a serious description of Waddington, even for those who have never heard of him.
What do all these examples have in common? They are certainly hearably hostile. Indeed, the verb`to hansardise' has entered Members' lore to mean`to use a Member's words against themselves' (we are indebted to the editor of Hansard for this observation, made in a personal communication). But how does it work? Each usage recruits the unchallengeably recorded words of an opponent and emphasizes just how much of an opponent that person is. It is their oppositionality that is the key: having those words said by your opponent immediately debars a whole class of objection, namely that those words are motivated by selfinterest. It deprives your current antagonist of the chance to say, as Edwards and Potter have it,`well, they would say that wouldn't they' as they might have, had it come from an interested party (Edwards and Potter 1992: 117) . The literal recruitment device is a shield of disinterest, a specially forceful version of what Potter calls`stake inoculation' (Potter 1996: 124 ±128) . Now that we have the basic formula set up, we can accumulate examples to establish the point and get across the variety of ways in which the theme is played out. In every case the thing to watch for is the eort after literal quotation of an established opponent and the protection it oers, and then the particular support it gives the speaker's own argument.
What the opponent really believes
In the next example of direct quotation's rhetorical eect, the speaker is some way into a long speech in which he lists external bodies which have, according to him, expressed reservations about the Government's plans for welfare provision. We come to the next in the series of such bodies, the Citizen Advice Bureaux. It is not Waterson's quotation of the Bureaux that interests us (lines 12 and 14), but that from his opponent, the Government minister, at lines 16 to 22. (9) We note in passing the speaker's positive endorsement of the body he is citing (it`has sensible things to say'; it is perspicacious enough to bè in no doubt about the Government's true motives'). What interests us is his recruitment of the Minister's words not simply to bolster his and the Bureaux's point, but to demonstrate that the Minister really agrees with him`deep down' (line 15). The evidence comes from no less a place than, as we are now well used to seeing, Hansard's verbatim record of the Minister's own words, transcribed for posterity in lines 16 to 22. Indeed, the trope works so well by itself that that Waterson can round things o with the mere bathetic gloss`That was a very clear statement', and the hearer is left in no doubt about the point being made: that Waterson's opponent himself agrees with Waterson.
Of course, what the opponent`really believes' can be turned against him or her in other ways, and perhaps the most prevalent in Parliamentary argument is the claim that the other party has been inconsistent (or worse). Consider this extended example: (10) What Thompson is up to is laying before the House a series of quotations which reveal the current Government to have so changed their position as to be hearably hypocriticalÐsaying one thing and doing another. The repeated quotations, at lines 7 to 10, 14 and 16, 25 to 29, and 31 and 34, work to drive the source deep into enemy territory, and end with a quote from a member visibly present in the house (Skinner). Note how this Labour MP (although not a Minister) attempts to rebut the accusation not by challenging the quotation (as we have seen, this never happens when Hansard is accurately quoted), but by denying its relevance to the situation at handÐthe circumstances today`cannot in any way be described as comparable with the 1986 Act', lines 37 and 38).
The mystery source
In the ®nal set of cases we want to look at, we see the speaker dramatize the identity of the source quoted. In the ®rst example, an ex-Home secretary is complaining about the short time available to debate a complex bill proposed by the Government. Note that, unlike all the previous examples so far, here the speaker does not make a point of identifying, in advance, the source of what he is about to quote. That turns out not to be accidental.
(11) [Hansard vol. 303, 17 December 1997, cols. 414 ± 415.] 1 Mr Michael Howard: Quali®ed majority voting, the 2 co-decision procedure, institutional change,¯exibility, the 3 free movement of people, discrimination, subsidiarity, 4
proportionality and the location of European institutions 5 are all vital issues of constitutional importance, and the 6 Government deem it ®t to debate them, if at all, for just a 7 few hours.`Guillotines can be justi®ed only where an 8
Opposition have ®libustered a Bill, where they have refused 9 all reasonable suggestions to agree a timetable, or where 10 there is no possibility of the Government getting their 11 A business through at reasonable speed without a guillotine.'Ð 12 A [Ocial Report, 1 February 1988, vol. 126, col. 756 Government should not get their business through at 20 reasonable speed without the guillotine.
The punch, of course, comes in lines 11 and 13, where the identity of the quoted person is revealed not to be the speaker himself, but none other than his current antagonist,`the present Home Secretary'. Thus the implications of the quoted wordsÐthat they are evidence not merely of the speaker's own, obviously partial, line but also of his opponent'sÐare given dramatic stage lighting. The source stands revealed after the audience has been ostensibly puzzled and teased by a mystery. Of course, given the public nature of this genre and its transparency to its hearers, the revelation that the person quoted is the speaker's opponent is something of an open secret: yet the trick retains its power, just as any properly executed stagecraft does. The next example is from the same debate, and shows a still more elaborate version of the mystery source staging than that in example (11). Notice that the upcoming quote is attributed only to`an experienced member', and that the words of this mysterious person are teasingly reported a snippet at a time:
(12) [Hansard vol. 303, 17 December 1997, col. 446] 1 Mr. Gary Streeter (South-West Devon): On 13 January 2 1994, an experienced Member stood at the Opposition 3 Dispatch Box and complained that in introducing a 4 A timetable motion the then Government showed`a callous 5 A disregard for our democratic procedures'. The hon. 6
Gentleman protested: 7 A`The way in which the Government have tried to force 8 A through the business is a contempt of the House.' He added: 9 A`The procedure that we are now discussing is completely 10 A unnecessary. We are using time to discuss the guillotine 11 A motion that we could have used to discuss aspects of the Bill 12 A which are important to hon. Members.' The hon. Streeter's introduction of his mystery source must, we imagine, have puzzled very few of his listeners. The whole trajectory of his account is towards hostile quotation and it will probably have surprised no-one that the source eventually revealed in lines 18 to 22 is indeed a member of the opposing party (and, indeed, the Minister whose bill this now is, the`very person who will respond to the debate on behalf of the Government', lines 20±22). Doling out the quotation in ®ve separate rations perhaps adds to the theatrical suspense, but its true rhetorical eect is to further enhance the crucial element of the quoted source's counterintuitive identity.
Comparative cases
We have seen, in the foregoing, literal recruitment work to emphasize the identity of the quoted person, to dramatize that identity, and to reveal their true position. All of these rhetorical eects work on certain normative expectations in the way literal recruitment works. We can use occasions on which the polish slips to reveal the operation of that expectation. The following examples show Parliamentarians orienting to the expectations that quotation is accurate, hostile, and, ®nally, that it does indeed come from an opponent.
Hostile intent
In the ®rst case, we see a speaker go out of his way to be seen to try and delete the hostile implications of quoting others:
(13) [Hansard vol. XXX, 25 November 1997, col. 819] 1 Sir Brian Mawhinney: _ At the risk of upsetting traditionalists, 2 I shall depart for a moment from the normal confrontational 3 tone of our debates in the House and pay a genuine tribute to 4 the Home Secretary. It was courageous and typically honest of 5 him to state quite openly what he has stated frequently in the 6 past, and what all hon. Members know to be true: when it 7 comes to elections to the House, he has no great love of any 8 form of proportional representation. Hon. Members will 9 remember that fact, which I do not mention in any aggressive 10 sense. I pay tribute to him. The speaker's own acknowledgement that what he is doing is unusual, and the explicit praise of his opponent as`courageous and typically honest', underline the more usual default implications that quoting others is normally understood to involve attacking them.
False quotation
Here we see an exchange in which a putative quote is made, and resisted.
(14) [Hansard vol. XXX, 11 November 1996, col. 93] 1 Mr Pickthall: The Government want to create a system 2 in which schools select pupilsÐthat cannot be reiterated 3 too oftenÐand in which only a minority of parents and 4 pupils will select their schools. In the Queen's Speech 5 debate on education, the hon. Member for Rugby and 6
Kenilworth said: 7`Schools should have a greater say in choosing the children 8 whom they take in.' 9 A Mr. Pawsey: That was not me. 10 A Mr. Pickthall: I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon; it 11 was the right hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden 12 (Dame A. Rumbold). The hon. Gentleman in fact said: 13 A`The new education Bill will give schools greater freedom to 14 A select pupils by ability. 'Ð[Ocial Report, 29 October 1996, 15 vol. 284, cols. 483, 502.] The fact that Pawsey should counter the alleged quotation shows his concern for (his orientation to, in conversation-analytic terms with less suggestion of internal motivation) the implications of being quoted. What is even more interesting is that only when Pickthall corrects himself and the correct citation is made does the Hansard reference appear in the record.
3. Denying the identity of the quoted source as the speaker's opponent We end with a telling failing caseÐthat is, an occasion on which things patently do not go to plan, and we have an apparent failure to bring o the kind of recruitment which seems to have been carried o well enough by the two speakers in our earlier examples. The trouble that ensues for this new speaker is evidence that the successful recruitment matters to himÐso although it looks like an unsuccessful attempt to recruit, the resistance with which it meets is con®rmation of the power that it would otherwise have had. We are indebted for this example to our colleague Paul Dickerson, from whose article on the citation of (any) authority it comes (Dickerson 1997: 45± 46 Note the canonical features of the recruitment: the explicit invocation of an authorized source of the words (here, again, Hansard, even though we are now in a television studio); the dramatically explicit claim that this is a literal quotation (Heseltine punctiliously asks permission to quote, and then names the date as if reading from the very pages of Hansard there and then); and the clear implication that this is from Heseltine's opponent and a member of his current opponent's (i.e., Benn's) own party.
But the quotation is capsized by Benn's intervention. He seizes his moment to interject (at line 15),`a Tory (1.0) he's a Tory', as a parenthesis in Heseltine's monologue. If this is conceded, it wholly de¯ates the point Heseltine was trying to make, that the words he is about to quote are not from a Tory (one of his own) but from a Labour opponent. Indeed, he goes out of his way to break o from his monologue's trajectory and try to establish that`Dick Marsh (.) Dick Marsh was the Labour Minister when this'. The audience laughter suggests that it treats this as what we might gloss as knockabout political humor, but what we notice is the very precise targetting by Benn, and the point of active resistance by Heseltine, of the crucial issue of who, exactly, Heseltine is quotingÐfriend or foe. The fact that they ®ght over it is good evidence that it is a valuable resource. Were Benn to get across his point that Marsh was not in fact the opponent Heseltine claims him to be, Heseltine's rhetorical wind would be taken from his sails.
Conclusion
We have analyzed here a number of arguments which took place in the British House of Commons, and one from a television political discussion program. What we set out to do was to show how people could make use of a special feature of their discursive world, namely the existence of a public, authorized record of what their opponents have said, on the record. The examples came from the British House of Commons, but in principle the verbatim record of other parliaments is available to be used in similar ways.
Literal recruitment works to provide an unchallengeable, impartial, and counterintuitive source for the speaker's position. There are a number of elements to how it works. Using the public record renders the speaker's words unchallengeable by virtue of public convention, and we showed a corroborating example of a case where the speaker did not oer proper quotation (example [2]) and was subsequently challenged. Using the words of a political opponent disarms any objection that the words issue from a partial or interested source (as discussed by Edwards and Dickerson 1997) , and we saw examples of speakers underlining the weight of the opponent and their prototypicality as a member of the opposing Party (examples [5] and [6] ), or one whose status as such is emphasized as in example (7) or comically burlesqued, as in example (8). The exactitude and authority of the quote can be used to reveal the`truth' of the case, even to go so far as to reveal what the opponent really thinks`deep down' (as in examples [9] and [10] ). The identity of the quoted person can also be held back to upgrade its importance by casting it as a`mystery', and, in examples (11) and (12), we saw how speakers revealed the source dramatically; but the oppositional identity of the quoted source can also be resisted (example [15] ). Examples (14) and (15) showed members' orientations to the normative expectations that suuse the Parliamentary scene, and make literal quotation work as a hostile, unchallengeable, proof of the rightness of the speaker's caseÐeven the opposition agrees with it.
Is this rhetorical device unique to the British parliamentary milieu? It is an open question whether its use extends to parliamentary chambers other than the British House of Commons (the database examined in this article) but, even outside such special speech communities, in one sense the answer is no. In mundane conversations people report what others had said, and use the reports to support their arguments. There is no reason why the`even our enemies would say this' device could not be used. Certainly it is on a par with a catalogue of other ways of protecting one's`stake and interest' (as the discursive psychologist Potter puts it: see especially Potter [1996: chapter 5] ). But there are some important dierences, which imply that the device might work dierently as a tool in the parliamentary context than in mundane conversations. One could say that the rhetorical device we have described is, logically speaking, a weak argument, in fact an ad hominem fallacy. Believe that the earth is¯at and the center of the solar system because the church says so. My argument is right, and yours is wrong because somebody elseÐeven you yourself, or someone of your partyÐbelieves what I do. My dispositions are right because even my enemy has them. But then, the House of Commons conducts itself as a partisan institution. Oppositions and alliances are explicit, matters of common display and even partly embodied in seating arrangements. The winning of arguments may lie in how the votes are cast. In this context, using the positions of relevant others to warrant one's argument is exactly appropriate. The persuasiveness and the eects of the turn of argument depend on the language game in which it is used. When the language game explicitly privileges words from the written record, it turns those words into a weapon more forceful than they would have been if lost to the air.
